Was visual contact between MH370 and other flights possible after the FMT?

trise5631, Jean-Luc Marchand & Captain Patrick Blelly (r)

trise5631@gmx.com, jean-luc.marchand@mh370-caption.net,
patrick.blelly@protonmail.com

CAPTION - Version 1.a – 6 April 2025

0. Executive Summary

On March 7, 2014, flight MH370 likely crossed paths with a very small number of other flights. Analysis of trajectory data retrieved from the FlightAware web pages shows that, in the absence of any reports from other flights, flight MH370 must have turned off its external lights and likely crossed paths with only three or four other flights. These flights did not see it because of the dark, moonless night and because it was likely at a lower flight level. Using the piloted flight path reconstructed by Captain Blelly and J-L. Marchand as a reference trajectory, the shortest estimated crossing distance is only 12 nautical miles for two of these flights. MH370 was therefore unable to avoid visual contact with them. The flight formation of these two aircraft flying between flight levels FL320 and FL380, one directly above the other, suggests that flight MH370 crossed them from below, which corroborates the flight level FL300 calculated by Captain Blelly and J-L. Marchand. A video summary is also available at https://youtu.be/h5GuRHr63xI.

1 Introduction

Captain Martyn Smith's recent testimony about flight UAE407 on 8 March 2014 [2] raised some interesting questions about the possibility that flight MH370 was sighted (and vice versa), or at least being in the vicinity of other flights at certain times. We now know that Captain Smith confirmed that he was not on board aircraft A6EDO on 7 March 2014 (UTC) [3]. Thus, no visual contact is confirmed on that day (which was actually at night in that region). But what about other flights nearby?

The objective of this report is to identify potential flights that could have been in visual contact with or nearby MH370, to assess their separation distance and, at the same time, to obtain valuable indirect information about MH370. The focus is on the southern leg of the trajectory after the final major turn (FMT), i.e. essentially after the phone call at 19:41 UTC. In this analysis, the reference trajectory of MH370 is the one reconstructed and documented by Captain Blelly and J-L. Marchand [4].

2 Flights in the area

The geographical area of interest for this analysis is the East part of the Indian Ocean as illustrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Geographical area under analysis in this report

Mr. Trise's developed software tools allowed to extract the majority of the data supporting this analysis from the historical database hosted by Flightaware.com (FA) and relating to March 7, 2014 (UTC).

The following methodology was used:

1. Exporting flight information from a commercial flight database created in 2015 (StandingData.sqb used by VirtualRadarServer[1])
2. Selecting flights for which the great circle between the origin and destination airport crosses the area of interest
3. Consulting FlightAware pages systematically to find the tracklog, and possibly the filed flight plan corresponding to each flight, if it existed for March 7 UTC
4. Exporting the points of each flight path found from FlightAware pages
5. Processing and interpolating between successive points of each path for better granularity.

This systematic search reduces the likelihood of missing a potential flight.

A video illustration of the set of flights identified in this region can be viewed in the animation available at [1] https://youtu.be/h5GuRHr63xI

A caveat must be placed regarding the accuracy of this data as this region is not under radar

[1] *https://web.archive.org/web/20151018183251/http://www.virtualradarserver.co.uk/Files/StandingData.sqb.gz*

or ADS-B coverage. FlightAware (FA) provides “estimated” locations as well as “FlightAware Approximate” locations that are simply interpolated locations along the great circle between actual reported positions.

Thus, even though the subsequent flight tracks reflect the actual flown trajectory, there is some marginal error. In addition, the actual flown path also could slightly differ from the filed flight plan as ATC clearances (unknown by us) might have possibly modified the flight route.

For example, flight SIA478 from Singapore to Johannesburg displays a near-direct FA trajectory across the Indian Ocean (the solid white line in Figure 2) while its filed flight plan (the dashed blue line) displays a two-leg trajectory with a turn at waypoint KETIV which is further north.

Other positions named “Aus ATC (Calculated)” come from Australian ATC and appear to be computed based on ADS-C position reports, likely transmitted via satellite. The irregular timing of the “Aus ATC (Calculated)” positions shows statistical picks at 1, 2, 5 and 30 minutes intervals which seem to be more consistent with ADS-C periodic contracts than a simple extrapolation of the last known radar/ADS-B position. Other intervals may be due to request and event contracts, when overflying a waypoint, changing altitudes, etc.

Additionally, the time variation attached to these positions means that they can be offset by +/- 30 sec from the actual positions.



Figure 2: Comparison of SIA478 filed flight plan (dashed line) and FlightAware estimated positions (plain line)

Nevertheless, the tracks data still delivers information with credible substance as shown below.

3 Only a few flights could have crossed the reference trajectory of flight MH370

The systematic approach to identifying flights recorded in this region at this time of day resulted in a list of 91 flights [5], presented in Annex 1 in Section 8[2]. A thorough review of this list identified five flights that might have met the conditions for possible visual contact.

They are listed in Table 1 in chronological order of their potential encounter with flight MH370, which is assumed to have followed the Blelly/Marchand reference trajectory.

Note: The time and distance of the encounter obviously depend on the reference trajectory chosen for MH370.

Adopting the perspective of visual contact, the time of "crossing" is recorded when one aircraft crosses the extrapolated flight path of the other. It could be MH370 or the other aircraft encountered. The reported distance is measured between the two aircraft at that very moment. This distance is used to assess the likelihood that the encountering aircraft saw MH370 or vice-versa. For increased precision, the minimum distance between the encounters and the time when its occurred are also reported in the last two columns.

Table 1: Identified flights that could have seen MH370 (times are UTC on March 7, 2014 and distances are in Nm)

Flight	Flight Level	Route	Crossing Time* (UTC)	Closest "visual" distance* (Nm)	Location	Minimum distance* (Nm)	Time at Minimum Distance*
MH370	FL300						
UAE359**	?	Direct to NISOK	19:15:00	75	1.02°/ 96.36°	39	~19:19:00
SIA478 (Flight plan)	FL340	N628 (to KETIV) Flight plan	19:30:00	130	-0.16°/ 96.04°	107	19:43:00
SIA478 (great circle)†	?	Direct, not on documented route	19:46:00	85	-1.70°/ 94.76°		
ETD461‡	FL320 climbing FL340	Near N509 (to MUTMI)	20:00:33	24	-4.34°/ 93.24°	12	20:02:10
UAE407‡[3]	FL360 climbing FL380	Near N509 (to MUTMI)	20:00:38	24	-4.34°/ 93.24°	12	20:02:15
SAA280			00:29:00 02:00:00	762 85		late passing south of the ditching zone	

** Reference trajectory by Blelly/Marchand*

*** based on statistics using the trajectories flown by UAE359 from 2022 to 2025*

† Information on SIA478 is two-fold: via its filed flight-Plan and via the estimated route based on ADS-B points extrapolation

‡ they flew at less than 2Nm interval from each other, UAE407 directly above ETD461

No other flight was found sufficiently close to meet the criteria of a potential visual contact with MH370.

[2] The CSV files of the flights are available at: https://www.mh370-caption.net/wp-content/uploads/Caption-SIOtraffic.zip

[3] This flight is the one which did take place on 7 March 2014 UTC (thus not Captain Smith's)

4 Polar graphs of the identified key flights

Flights SIA478, ETD461, UAE407 and UAE359 require a more detailed analysis of their possible encounter with flight MH370. The relative position graphs presented in this section illustrate the values indicated in the “Minimum Distance” and “Time at Minimum Distance” columns of Table 1 above. The other flights deserve less detail because they potentially crossed the path of MH370 much further away. The time is given as UTC. An angle of 0° means an aircraft is ahead at 12 o'clock while an angle of 90° means it is to the right at 3 o'clock.



Figure 3: Position of SIA478 relative to MH370



Figure 4: Position of MH370 relative to SIA478



Figure 5: Position of ETD461 relative to MH370



Figure 6: Position of MH370 relative to ETD461



Figure 7: Position of UAE407 relative to MH370



Figure 8: Position of MH370 relative to UAE407



Figure 9: Position of UAE359 relative to MH370



Figure 10: Position of MH370 relative to UAE359

Note: The relative positions of MH370 and UAE359 are the result of statistical computations using trajectories flown by UAE359 from 2022 to 2025.

5 Important observations

a) None of the flights listed in Table 1 mentioned or reported visual contact with another flight during their journey.
b) Both ETD461 and UAE407 had received a block clearance, meaning they could climb at their own pace between their respective flight level limits.
c) Their respective trajectory interpolations provided by FlightAware show that ETD461 and UAE407 were only a few seconds apart in time, i.e. less than 16 seconds in the area of interest. UAE407 was flying directly above ETD461while at 20:02 they were horizontally close to +/- 1 Nm (see Figure 11).



Figure 11: Relative horizontal distance in Nm between ETD461 and UAE407 (7 March 2014 UTC)

d) The comparison between the ground projection of the flight plan filed by UAE407 and the ground projection of its estimated positions on the great flight circle (FA) from ADS-B and radar data shows a good agreement (see Figure 12) as the trajectory is almost straight. The flight appears to have followed this route segment of its filed flight plan, i.e. from location 8S93E to the MUTMI waypoint. The conclusions drawn from the ADS-B FA positions are generally reliable given the slow evolution of aircraft speed and the coherence with the ADS-C reports when available.



Figure 12: Comparison of UAE407 filed flight plan (dashed line) and FlightAware estimated positions (plain line)

e) The same result is obtained for ETD461 as illustrated in Figure 13.



Figure 13: Comparison of ETD461 filed flight plan (dashed line) and FlightAware estimated positions (plain line)

f) SIA478 deviated from its filed flight plan before leaving Sumatra due to bad weather conditions. From the ADS-B reports, the estimated direction appears to be towards waypoint ODIRU. The path was calculated using the last known Mach and the GDAS meteo data. The FA great circle extrapolation appears inaccurate. Thus, SIA478 (Flight plan) posts an estimated closest distance from MH370 greater than ~100 Nm (~185 km).

g) No UAE359 filed flight plan is known. But the absence of ADS-B position report in the Strait of Malacca leads to conclude that it did fly a route in the west of Sumatra probably overflying the waypoint NOSIK. The correlation between the interpolated points by FA and the reported ADS-B/ADS-C position by FlightRadar24 of the UAE359 flights which took place in the years 2022 to 2025 (cf Figure 14) shows that on 7 March (UTC) this UAE359 flight was heading to NISOK. Figure 14 illustrates also that direct clearances to NOSIK were common practices. But on 7 March, as the time when UAE359 started its direct leg to NOSIK, if it did, is unknown, this start is taken on route L896 at OBMAT. Thus, UAE359 shows an estimated closest distance from MH370 at ~38 Nm (~70 km)



Figure 14: Cumulative heatmap of documented UAE359 flights in the years 2022 until 2025

h) Flight SAA280 was added to the list of possible flights because it could have flown south of the ditching area and may have been able to see the debris field. However, the discrepancy between its filed flight plan and the estimated trajectory computed by FA is striking as shown in Figure 15. It is believed that the filed flight plan was most probably flown as the known segments match better the latter.



Figure 15:Comparison of SAA280 filed flight plan with FlightAware estimated positions

In any case, the analysis below leads to eliminating this flight from the list because the distance is considered too great and the weather too unfavourable.

The FlightAware estimated position of flight SAA280 at 00:29 is shown in Figure 16. The measured distance of 762 Nm clearly makes it impossible to observe the ditching of flight MH370 live.



Figure 16: SAA280 position at 00:29 UTC (white dots) relative to MH370 (cyan dots)

The significance of this flight could have been found later in the flight.
At 02:00 UTC, flight SAA280 passed abeam in the south of the estimated ditching zone at an approximate distance of 85Nm which could potentially have led to visual contact as illustrated in Figure 17.



Figure 17: Position of SAA280 at 02:00 UTC at a distance of ~85Nm (white dots) relative to MH370 ditching zone

But, the analysis of the weather conditions at that time shows that the cloud cover probably did not allow SAA280 to see much, as illustrated in Figure 18.



Figure 18: Cloud cover when SAA280 passed in the south of the ditching area (source Metop, 02:05 UTC)

Thus, SAA280 is not considered any further.

6 Conclusions

All the important observations above allow us to draw interesting conclusions by recalling that the reference trajectory is Blelly/Marchand's.

The conclusions are presented in ascending order of their usefulness.

1. Only four aircraft, SIA478, UAE359, ETD461, and UAE407, would have been able to establish visual contact with flight MH370.
2. None of them reported visual contact with MH370.
3. For flight SIA478, the lack of a report is understandable given the significant distance of over 85 Nm. MH370 would have been visible if it had turned on its exterior lights. The same remark applies to flight UAE359 which was also too far away.
4. ETD461 and UAE407 also did not report visual contact with MH370. However, both were much closer, about 12 Nm from MH370 (see Figure 5, Figure 7 & Figure 19) just after 20:00:00 UTC. If MH370's lights had been on, they could not have missed it; see Captain Smith's report of an encounter the next day. So, either MH370 wasn't there, or it was there according to the Blelly/Marchand trajectory, but with its lights off, it was invisible in the darkness of a moonless night. The moon set around 17:00 UTC in the west of Sumatra.



Figure 19: Encounter of UAE407 both ETD461 flights with MH370 (Blue) at 20:00:00 UTC

5. The important conclusion regarding the two flights, ETD461 and UAE407, stems from their vertical formation flight configuration (see Figure 19 and Figure 20). Together, they blocked flight levels from FL320 to FL380 and headed toward MH370 with their exterior lights on. This left little choice for a possible crossing with minimal risk: either go over this tandem or under it. In other words, either above FL380 or below FL320, as shown in Figure 20.



Figure 20: Configuration of the potential crossing between MH370 and the tandem UAE407 and ETD461 blocking FL320 to FL380

6. The reference trajectory being that of Blelly/Marchand, the aircraft could not be at an altitude between FL310 and FL390 because flying at night in the blocked levels would have been too risky and in contradiction with the precautions taken by the aircraft until now to remain undetectable.
7. From experience, with no operating TCAS and knowing that the encounter aircraft were flying en-route and thus most likely in a step climb, and without knowing their exact flight level difficult to estimate at night, a descent is better controlled and faster thus safer than a climb that can be hazardous and slow.
8. In addition, a pilot would choose to fly below these flights to ensure better undetectability when crossing them. By flying over them, he places himself in the field of vision of the other pilots and could have the exhaust gas and the potential contrail detected even though the meteo conditions were not favourable for the latter.
9. The Blelly/Marchand trajectory flight level on this segment is calculated at FL300 according to the Boeing table provided in the FCOM manual for these fuel flow and speed. This is in full coherence with point 7 above (cf Figure 21)



Figure 21: MH370 best option to cross UAE407 and ETD461

Note: During the encounter, remaining at a low altitude, close to the route floor in this oceanic region, i.e. FL250, would be the best option for a pilot.

7 References

[1] Summary video of the traffic in the area after FMT : https://youtu.be/h5GuRHr63xI

[2] Captain Smith's testimony on R. Godfrey's blog on 8 March 2025 at 14:32 (https://www.mh370search.com/2024/05/05/new-search/comment-page-7/#comments)

[3] Personal contact with Captain Smith on 8 March 2025

[4] Analysis of the trajectory of Flight MH370, Captain P. Blelly & JL. Marchand, Version 2.0 – 16 February 2023 – updated 22 March 2023 https://www.mh370-caption.net/wp-content/uploads/3-known-trajectory-and-recalculated-trajectory.pdf

[5] The full set of data of the 91 potential flights is available on our website at https://www.mh370-caption.net/wp-content/uploads/Caption-SIOtraffic.zip

8 Annex 1: Identified flights in the MH370 zone and timing

This annex provides the FlightAware links of all scheduled flights that took off on March 7, 2014 (UTC) and crossed the area of interest. The full data set is downloadable at [5].

https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SIA478/history/20140307/1810
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE405/history/20140307/1720
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE407/history/20140307/1125
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/RBA54/history/20140307/0225
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/BKP711/history/20140307/0225
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/BKP712/history/20140307/0740
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/CPA748/history/20140307/1030
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/CPA749/history/20140307/1555
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/VOZ30/history/20140307/0645
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/MDG10/history/20140307/1340
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/QFA63/history/20140307/2335
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/QFA64/history/20140307/1550
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/THY66/history/20140307/2240
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/THY67/history/20140307/1335
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/VOZ4149/history/20140307/0625
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/VOZ1909/history/20140307/0020
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE356/history/20140307/0040
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE357/history/20140307/1045
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE358/history/20140307/0645
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE359/history/20140307/1715
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE404/history/20140307/0535
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE406/history/20140307/0610
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE408/history/20140307/2300
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE409/history/20140307/0150
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE412/history/20140307/0615
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE413/history/20140307/1045
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE414/history/20140307/2150
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE415/history/20140307/1900
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE418/history/20140307/1230
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE419/history/20140307/1925
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE420/history/20140307/2255
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE421/history/20140307/1405
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE424/history/20140307/0625
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE425/history/20140307/2200
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE432/history/20140307/0800
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE433/history/20140307/0135
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE434/history/20140307/0625
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE435/history/20140307/1050
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE440/history/20140307/2205
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE441/history/20140307/1205
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE423/history/20140307/0710
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE422/history/20140307/1745
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE368/history/20140307/1505
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/ETD451/history/20140307/0955
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/ETD454/history/20140307/1750
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/ETD455/history/20140307/1050
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/ETD461/history/20140307/1210
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/ETD470/history/20140307/1540
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/ETD473/history/20140307/0155

https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/ETD474/history/20140307/2240
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/GIA725/history/20140307/0940
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/GIA724/history/20140307/0315
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/MAU641/history/20140307/1730
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/QTR672/history/20140307/2155
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/QTR900/history/20140307/2245
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/QTR901/history/20140307/1445
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/QTR904/history/20140307/2155
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/QTR905/history/20140307/1255
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SAA280/history/20140307/1905
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SAA281/history/20140307/1545
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SAA286/history/20140307/1515
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SAA287/history/20140307/1550
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SVA814/history/20140307/0000
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SVA816/history/20140307/1820
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/THA991/history/20140307/1815
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/THA484/history/20140307/0110
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/THA483/history/20140307/1700
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/LNI232/history/20140307/0050
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/LNI230/history/20140307/1115
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/XAX237/history/20140307/2240
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/MAS124/history/20140307/0830
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/MAS126/history/20140307/1830
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/JSA134/history/20140307/0025
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/JST116/history/20140307/0205
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/QFA77/history/20140307/0105
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SIA216/history/20140307/1805
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SIA224/history/20140307/2240
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SIA226/history/20140307/0730
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SIA214/history/20140307/0930
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SCO7/history/20140307/1125
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SIA479/history/20140307/1135
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/ATN460/history/20140307/0120
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/MAS194/history/20140307/1220
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/QFA9/history/20140307/0515
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE355/history/20140307/1310
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SLK467/history/20140307/1750
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SIA502/history/20140307/1205
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SIA503/history/20140307/1740
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/QFA78/history/20140307/1035
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SIA7366/history/20140307/1805
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/SIA7971/history/20140307/0850

9 Annex 2: Key flights information in the area of interest on 7 March 2014 UTC.

9.1 Specifics

For the key flights, FlightAware specific information is provided increasing minimum distance order:

Flight ID	Registra-tion	URL	Min Dist (nm)	Type	Origin	Destination
ETD461	A6-ETN	https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/A6ETN/history/20140307/1210	11.8	B777-300ER	Melbourne	Abu Dhabi
UAE407	A6-EDO	https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/A6EDO/history/20140307/1125	11.8	A380-800	Melbourne	Dubai
UAE359	A6-EBP	https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE359/history/20140307/1715	38.8	B777-300ER	Tangerang	Dubai
SIA478	9V-SVN	https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/9VSVN/history/20140307/1810	108.1	B777-200ER	Singapore	Johannesburg
SAA280	ZS-SXC	https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/ZSSXC/history/20140307/1905	N/A	A340-300	Johannesburg	Perth

9.2 Filed flight plans

Flight ID	
ETD461	DCT NEVIS H345 BOR N0494F300 DCT 35S137E 33S132E DCT FRT DCT 27S122E 24S118E DCT ONSLO M083F300 DCT 20S113E M083F320 17S109E 14S105E 08S098E DCT MUTMI M083F340 DCT ELATI N0493F340 N640 KAT R461 DEMON M083F340 R461 MDI N0492F340 M300 ORISA N0488F360 M300 EMURU N563
UAE407	DCT ML H345 BOR DCT 35S137E 33S132E DCT FRT DCT 27S122E 24S118E DCT ONSLO M084F340 DCT 20S113E M084F360 17S109E 14S105E 08S098E DCT MUTMI M084F380 DCT ELATI N0488F380 N640 KAT R461 DEMON M084F380 R461 MDI N0486F380 M300 LEMAX N0486F400 M300 EMURU P570 ITURA M762
SIA478	BOBAG R469 PKU N628 ODIRU N0485F360 N628 DABAP N0471F300 P627 KADAP M083F360 R348 LATEP N0486F360 R348 LUXAG N0477F380 R348 RUPIG UR348G MT UR348 TNV UB536 VSO N0474F400 UB536 EROPA UT536 VMA UG745 ANVAK N0406F240 G745
SAA280	DCT APDAK UQ48 APMAT N0477F340 UG10 TGV N0478F330 UQ17 ANVED M081F350 DCT 33S035E 36S040E 38S045E 40S050E 41S055E 4126S05700E 42S060E M080F370 43S065E 44S070E 45S075E 45S080E 44S085E 43S090E 42S095E 40S100E 37S105E M080F390 34S110E DCT KEELS N0460F390 T12 WAVES
UAE359	No filed flight plan found